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Using data from the BHPS, we estimate the impact of occupational pensions on wages and on the 
tenure profile of wages of male private sector workers in the UK. According to the theoretical 
literature,  occupational pensions participants should receive a premium at the beginning of their 
careers, when the financial quit disincentives stemming from defined benefit plans are less 
binding. Our empirical evidence is consistent with this prediction. We find that occupational 
pension participants earn a positive wage premium only at the beginning of the career. Once we 
account for the endogenous sorting of individuals into occupational pension schemes, the 
magnitude of the estimated premium decreases sharply and it looses statistical significance. 
Indeed, the wage premium appears to be completely explained by unobservable individual and job 
match heterogeneity. 
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1 Introduction
A number of issues are still unresolved in the literature on wage determination. At
the empirical level, much of the debate has focused on the issue of whether wages rise
with years of seniority and on the possible explanations for this e¤ect. The relation-
ship between occupational pension participation and wages has received only limited
attention. Furthermore, although occupational pensions play an important role in the
implicit contract literature, to the best of our knowledge no empirical studies have fo-
cused on the relationship between occupational pensions and tenure wage proles. This
paper attempts to ll this gap in the literature, its main aim being to investigate the
empirical validity of alternative theoretical explanations of the pension-wage nexus.
A common indirect nding stemming from the literature studying the relationship
between occupational pensions and job mobility is that workers in occupational pension
plans receive higher wages. Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) argue that rms o¤ering
pensions also pay wages set above competitive levels (e¢ ciency wages) to give workers
an incentive to stay in order to collect the stream of wage premiums. In this framework,
a pension premium accruing to occupational pension workers would be mainly driven
by unobservable factors specic to the worker-rm pair (unobservable job match hetero-
geneity). Alternatively, the implicit contract theory itself predicts higher wages in rms
o¤ering pensions of the dened benet type not because of e¢ ciency wages but because
rms must pay a compensating wage premium to workers who accept deferred wage
contracts (Ippolito, 1994). The premium is required because workers in long term con-
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tracts forgo some opportunities for higher-paying jobs in their career. Finally, Ippolito
(1997) suggests that any compensation scheme that emphasizes occupational pensions
can select in high quality workers (sorting e¤ect). In this model, rather then e¢ -
ciency wages or deferred wage premiums, pension wage premia would reect a superior
job performance of occupational pension participants, due to unobservable di¤erences
in earnings capacities among individuals (unobservable individual heterogeneity).
This paper investigates the empirical validity of these alternative explanations of
the pension-wage nexus. We focus on the United Kingdom, where occupational pen-
sion plans represent the more popular retirement saving vehicle among those available
to workers to supplement the basic State pension. Exploiting the longitudinal nature
of the British Household Panel Survey, we account for the role of di¤erent sources of
unobserved heterogeneity in shaping the e¤ect of occupational pension participation on
wages and on the tenure prole of wages. More specically, we structure the empiri-
cal analysis around three main questions. Do workers participating into occupational
pension plans receive a compensation premium? If this is the case, does this premium
vary over tenure? And what is the main source of this premium?
Our empirical strategy is as follows. After estimating with least squares a standard
wage equation augmented with occupational pension variables, we use instrumental
variables estimators and panel data estimators to control for the possible correlation
between regressors and unobservable factors. A comparison among these di¤erent es-
timators will suggest the most probable source of bias a¤ecting least squares results.
In addition, allowing the returns to occupational pensions to depend on tenure enables
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us to compare tenure wage proles between participants and non participants and to
appreciate the variation of the wage premium over their career.
The results show that the estimated occupational pension premiums are large and
signicant using least squares in a cross section of workers. In particular, we nd that
the wage premium is high and signicant early in tenure, when the nancial quit disin-
centives implicit in occupational pension plans of the dened benet type - dominant
in the UK - is less binding, while it decreases later in the worker career. When we use
panel data and instrumental variable estimators to control for the endogenous sorting
of individuals into occupational pension schemes, the magnitude of the premium de-
creases sharply, and it looses statistical signicance. Overall, our ndings are consistent
with the literature predicting that occupational pensions and wage proles are used in
combination to retain better workers (Ippolito, 1997) as well as with the strand arguing
that they reect e¢ ciency wages premia (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993), particularly
for younger workers (Akerlof and Katz, 1989). Indeed, we nd that both unobservable
individual characteristics and unobservable factors specic to a worker-rm pair play
an important role in determining wage premia.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briey reviews the theoretical
mechanisms proposed in the literature to explain the relationship between occupational
pensions and wages. Section 3 briey describe the UK pension system. Section 4
describes the data. Section 5 presents our empirical approach and discusses the results.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Framework
On the conceptual level, we know that wages and occupational pensions are jointly
determined. Occupational pension plans can be of two types: dened benet (DB)
plans and dened contribution (DC) plans. A DB plan defers a signicant portion of
compensation until the worker successfully completes long tenure. Alternatively, a DC
plan is a retirement saving account where the rm might contribute some percentage
of workerswages. To investigate the relationship between occupational pension (either
of the DB or the DC type), wages and tenure wage proles, it may be useful to recall
at least three competing hypotheses that have been used in the literature to explain
the relationship between employer sponsored retirement savings plans and employee
quitting behaviour.
Under the implicit contract theory, a DB plan is seen as an implicit contract un-
der which workers sacrice potential higher wages elsewhere in exchange for a stay
pension but are awarded a lower quit pension if they depart prematurely, thereby
imposing a pension loss on quitting.1 The pension capital loss has a concave shape
respect to employer tenure, being negligible at the beginning of the worker career. In
addition, the pension capital loss may trigger a selection e¤ect. A DB plan attracts
stayerswhile repelling quitters.2 The implicit contract theory applies to DB plans,
but not to DC plans where workers can quit any time after vesting3 without incurring
capital losses. The implicit contract theory predicts that rms using DB pensions pay
compensating wage premiums to workers who accept a deferred-wage contract. The
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premium is required because workers in long-term contracts forgo some opportunities
for higher-paying jobs later in their career (Ippolito 1994).
However, Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) nd that quit rates are lower in all pension
jobs, either of the DB or the DC type. This evidence cannot be easily intepreted within
the implicit contract theory framework. They argue that the pension-quit nexus can
be explained if rms o¤ering pensions also pay "e¢ ciency wages", which are wages set
above competitive levels to give workers an incentive to stay in order to collect the
stream of wage premiums. The bonding e¤ect of e¢ ciency wages is higher early in
tenure when the present value of premium is highest, and falls as workers collect the
premium each period (Akerlof and Katz 1989). Under this framework rms use both
occupational pensions, either of the DB or the DC type, and e¢ ciency wages to reduce
quit over all tenure levels.
Ippolito (1998, 2002) o¤ers an alternative idea that can be used to justify the pay-
ment of pension wage premia. If the attribute4 that makes some workers saversalso
makes them high-qualityworkers, any compensation package emphasizing occupa-
tional pensions will naturally attract savers. Assuming that rms will try to retain
their best workers (by paying them more, among other things), it follows that high-
quality workers will more often attain long tenure. This creates a potentially important
nexus: occupational pensions attract savers, who also are high-quality workers. In this
model, high wages in pension jobs do not necessarily reect either e¢ ciency wages or
compensation for sacricing mobility in the job market, but rather, may simply reect
the superior job performance of savers in the workforce. In this framework, both DB
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and DC plans can enhance productivity by attracting a high quality workforce.
Alternatively, the relationship between occupational pension participation and wages
as such has received only limited attention. In particular, although occupational pen-
sions play an important role in the implicit contract literature, no empirical studies
have focused on the relationship between occupational pensions and tenure wage pro-
les. The literature includes competing views of how wages are determined, even where
there is long-term job attachment. Some argue that wage experience and wage-tenure
proles are more likely to reect e¤orts by the rm to economize on the costs of specic
training or on the costs of generating a good match. Others argue that the proles
reect selection in mobility over the course of the life cycle, so that those with higher
productivity are more likely to stay with the job, or even pure returns to seniority.
While these issues are still unresolved, and notwithstanding the clear predictions stem-
ming from the theoretical literature5, the impact of occupational pension participation
on wages and on tenure wage proles has not been extensively studied at the empirical
level. The available studies limit their attention to analyze the relationship between
occupational pension participation and wages over the cross sectional dimension, often
nding a positive correlation.6 However, working with cross sectional data does not
allow to account for the inuence of unobservable factors. Alternatively, our empirical
strategy attempts to assess the existence, the magnitude and the tenure prole of the
occupational pension wage premium, accounting for endogeneity issues.
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3 Pension Arrangements in the UK
We focus our analysis on the United Kingdom, where occupational pensions play a
major role among the di¤erent pension arrangements workers are allowed to choose in
order to supplement the basic State pension. The current UK pension system has a
three tiered structure. The rst tier is public, and consists of a basic at-rate pension.
The second tier is mandatory and pension provision is split between the State - in the
form of the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) - and private companies
- in the form of occupational pension schemes, o¤ered by employers, and personal pen-
sion schemes, o¤ered by nancial institutions. Workers belong by default to SERPS,
but they are free to contract out an approved occupational pension, in case their em-
ployer o¤ers one, or an approved personal pension plan. Since 2001 the contracting out
option has been extended to the stakeholder pensions, provided in the form of DC
accounts by an insurer through the employees workplace. Employers are not mandated
to sponsor an occupational pension plan, while employees can always decide to remain
into SERPS or to contract out a personal pension plan even if they have been o¤ered
an occupational one. Furthermore, workerspension choices are mutually exclusive and
reversible. Finally, there is a third tier of voluntary private retirement saving. Given
the low benets provided by the public pension system, occupational pensions have an
important role in the UK, covering large portions of the workforce. Table 1 reports
gures from the Occupational Pensions Schemes Survey collected over the 90s by the
Government Actuary.7 To a downward trend in private sector occupational pension
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schemesmembership corresponds a relatively stable distribution of active members by
occupational plan type. In particular, more than 80 percent of plan participants still
belonged to DB plans by the end of the decade.
4 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample drawn from waves 1 to 11 of the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data, covering the period 1991-2001.8 The analysis
is restricted to full-time white males aged between 20 and 55, working as full time
employees (more than 30 hours per week) in the private non-agricultural sector. Indi-
viduals with missing or imputed data on the dependent or the independent variables are
excluded from the sample. In addition, only the respondents who are Original Sample
Members (OSM) and have reported in at least two waves that they were employed at
the time of the interview are considered. Based on these criteria an unbalanced panel
sample of 1.348 male employees and 9.103 observations in total is constructed.
The BHPS collects detailed information on individualsjob related and socio-economic
characteristics. In particular, employees are asked if their current employer runs a pen-
sion scheme for which they are eligible and if they participate to it. Workers partici-
pating to occupational pension plans are not further asked about the DB/DC nature
of their plan, while they are also asked if they contribute to a personal pension scheme.
Table 2 indicates that more than three quarters of our sample is covered by an occu-
pational pension plan, while participation rate is about 60 percent.
Table 3 contains pension status transitions for all individuals averaged over years.
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Although workers are free to choose their pension status each year, we can observe a
substantial inertia in pension status.
Finally, Table 4 displays descriptive statistics on our sample, divided by pension
scheme participation. It seems that workers participating to an occupational pension
plan (column two) are quite di¤erent in terms of observed characteristics from those
not participating. They have higher wages, longer employer tenure and labour market
experience, are more likely to be married, to receive job related training, to be union
member, while they are less likely to be in a temporary contract. The magnitude of
these di¤erences rises the suspect that pension and nonpension workers and/or jobs
could further di¤er in terms of unobservables. Our empirical strategy allows to control
for and assess the importance of di¤erent sources of heterogeneity.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Statistical model
Our empirical investigation on the relationship between wages and occupational pen-
sions is based on a standard wage equation described in Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
and Topel (1991), augmented with occupational pensions variables:9
wijt = 1Tijt + 2T
2
ijt + 3Expit + 4Exp
2
it (1)
+5OPijt + 6OPJijt + 7OPJ  Tijt + 8OPJ  T 2ijt +
KX
k=1
kx
k
it + "ijt;
"ijt = i + ij + vijt;
where wijt denotes the (log) gross hourly wage for individual i on job j at time t, Expit
is total potential labour market experience, Tijt is current employer tenure, OPijt is a
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dummy indicating the availability of an occupational pension scheme from the current
employer, OPJijt indicates individual participation to such a scheme, xkit (for k =
1; :::; K) is a set of K control variables for individual i on job j at time t that includes a
constant term, time dummies, regional dummies, occupation and qualication dummies,
establishment size dummies, two dummies for union coverage in the workplace and for
union membership, one for temporary job, one for job related training as well as a
dummy for joining a personal pension scheme and a marital status dummy. The error
term consists of three independent components. The rst one, i; is an individual-
specic e¤ect, capturing variations in wages that may be due to unobservable earnings
capacity across individuals (i.e. unobserved individual heterogeneity); the second, ij ;
is a job match-specic e¤ect, representing unmeasured e¤ects on wages that may be
specic to a worker-rm pair (i.e. unobserved job match heterogeneity); the third one,
vijt, is a white noise component, accounting for marketwide random shocks. Precise
denitions of the main variables used in model (1) can be found in Appendix 1.
This model specication enables us to appreciate the impact of occupational pen-
sions on wages not also at the beginning of a new job but also in shaping the e¤ects of
tenure on wages, that is to compare the tenure prole of wages of workers in and out
occupational pensions schemes.
5.2 Estimation methodology
Any covariance between the regressors and the unobservable factors represented in
"ijt would lead to biased least squares estimation results. Possible di¤erent signs and
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structures of the covariances between seniority, experience and individual and job match
specic e¤ects have been extensively discussed in the literature on job mobility and wage
growth.10 In this paper, we introduce and examine the e¤ects of a possible further
source of wage growth, that is the individuals participation to an occupational pension
scheme. Also in this case, endogeneity and heterogeneity issues need to be taken into
consideration. Indeed, comparing the wages of workers with and without occupational
pensions would likely provide biased results for the returns to tenure, due to the non
random assignment of workers to occupational pension schemes.11 As an attempt to
recover the true e¤ect of occupational pensions on wages and to compare the relative
importance of the individual and job heterogeneity bias, we use panel data and IV
estimators. Our estimation strategy is as follows.
We rst show the OLS estimation results (OLS). However, it is well known that least
squares estimators are likely to be biased in presence of endogeneity issues.12 We start
correcting at least for some of the possible estimation bias by using a panel data xed
e¤ects estimator (WG). If the endogeneity bias exists only due to unobserved individual
heterogeneity, that is only due to correlation between the unobserved time invariant in-
dividual characteristics and the observables, a panel data xed e¤ects estimator would
be appropriate. A substantial di¤erence with least squares results would indicate the
importance of individual unobserved heterogeneity and suggest the sign of the bias in
the least squares estimators on the variables in levels. However, theWG, a least squares
estimator on transformed variables, may be downward biased due to the presence of
measurement errors (Griliches and Hausman, 1984) and it does not account for the
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presence of other sources of endogeneity di¤erent from correlation between regressors
and unobserved individual xed e¤ects. Thus, in order to alleviate further endogeneity
issues stemming from a possible correlation with also the job match specic compo-
nent of the error term and to account for the possible presence of measurement errors,
we use instrumental variables procedures using the variables in levels. We exploit the
longitudinal structure of the data and instrument the tenure variables following the
procedure proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987), hereafter AS, and the experience
variables using the Finnies (1993) modication of the AS estimator.13 Moreover, we
instrument our variable of interest, the occupational pension participation variable, us-
ing the occupational pension o¤er rate by industry, rm size and union coverage. The
validity of the pension o¤er rate as an instrument for individual pension participation is
grounded on the fact that the percentage of employees joining an occupational pension
scheme within an industry, rm size and unionized sector is related to the individual
decision of an employee in the relative industry, rm size and union sector to join the
scheme but it is not related to any of the error components in the individuals wage
determination model (model (1)). Instrument variation is reported in Table 5. We
denote the estimator described above IVop. We expect this estimator to be free from
most of the biases. Because the WG produces an estimate of the returns to occupa-
tional pensions free from the bias due to correlation between the occupational pension
variables and individual xed e¤ects and IVop produces an estimate of the returns to
occupational pensions free from the bias due to correlation between the occupational
pension variables and both individual and job match e¤ects, a substantial di¤erence
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between WG e IVop can be interpreted as a signal of the importance of unobservable
job match heterogeneity. Thus, a comparison between OLS, WG e IVop could give an
indication of the relative importance of individual and job match heterogeneity in the
returns to occupational pensions.
5.3 Results
Table 6 contains the estimation results on the central variables.14 The complete list
of estimation results for all the control variables included in model (1) is reported in
Table 8.15 Looking at Table 6 (columns two and three), the rst observation to make
is that the fact that the current employer o¤ers a pension scheme is not signicant in
the mechanism underlying wage determination, whereas the employees decision to join
such a scheme seems to play an important role. Indeed, looking at the OLS results
(column two), the OP coe¢ cient is positive but not signicant whereas the OPJ is
large and signicant. Because the availability of an occupational pension scheme can
be considered as an (observable) match xed-e¤ect (see Table 3), this evidence seems
to point to the fact that job-specic characteristics do not play an important role in the
wage determination mechanism. Column three of Table 6 shows that the OLS results
obtained by removing OP from model 1 (OLS2 ) are virtually unchanged, thus this
variable is excluded from the set of explanatory variables to avoid further endogeneity
issues.16
Let us rst analyse the estimated coe¢ cient of OPJ obtained using the estimation
methods described above: OLS2, WG e IVop (columns three, four and ve in Table 6
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respectively). This variable is meant to capture the e¤ects of occupational pensions on
wages that are independent of tenure and other individual characteristics. Looking at
column three (OLS2 ) we nd a large and signicant wage premium accruing to occupa-
tional pensions schemes participants. Specically, the participation to an occupational
pension scheme would raise the wage of 0.23 percentage points. Column four contains
the WG results. We nd that, using such an estimator, the e¤ect of occupational
pensions participation on wages reduces substantially (from 0.23 to 0.06), although it
remains positive and statistically di¤erent from zero. Columns ve reports the IVop re-
sults. The estimated coe¢ cient of OPJ , not only decreases further (estimated impact
reduces from to 0.007 ) but also it looses its statistical signicance.17 These results
are consistent with least squares having a positive bias due to both individual and job
match unobserved heterogeneity Indeed, these unobservable factors appear to explain
completely the OLS estimated wage premium.
Let us now focus our attention on the estimated coe¢ cients of the variables in-
teracting the indicator of occupational pensions participation with tenure. We nd a
similar pattern across the di¤erent estimation methods. Let us comment our ndings
in details.
The estimated (cumulated) returns over tenure (corresponding to the estimation
results in Table 6) are reported in Table 7.18 According to the OLS estimates (OLS2,
column two), the returns to occupational pensions are large and signicant at the begin-
ning of a worker career. Specically, one year of tenure is associated with 0.23 percent
wage increase. When considering higher levels of tenure, the estimated magnitudes
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of the returns are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical literature. Indeed,
they appear rst decreasing and then increasing, showing a prole roughly symmetric
to the pension loss shape. However, the estimated coe¢ cients loose their statistical
signicance, starting from around ve years of tenure. This nding provides evidence
supporting in particular the Akerlof and Katz (1989) model. According to this theoreti-
cal framework, the pension penalty is insu¢ cient to deter shirking of workers with short
tenure and so the pension is coupled with an e¢ ciency wage. Following this intuition,
the model explains the wage premium for younger workers and predicts that the wage
premium should evaporate as tenure grows and pension incentives become important.
Column three of Table 7 reports the returns to occupational pensions obtained using
a panel data xed e¤ect estimator (WG). The substantial di¤erence with the OLS
results signals the importance of individual unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated
magnitudes of the coe¢ cients over tenure appear considerably reduced in magnitude
for all tenure levels. Looking at the returns at the beginning of a worker career, the
estimated impact of occupational pension participation on wages after one year of tenure
is still positive and statistically di¤erent from zero, but it reduces from 0.23 to 0.06
percentage points. When considering higher levels of tenure, the results remain in
line with the predictions of the Akerlof and Katz (1989) model. Indeed, the prole
of the estimated magnitudes preserves a shape roughly symmetric to the pension loss,
showing statistically non signicant values from roughly ve year of tenure onwards.
In addition, the di¤erence between OLS and WG results suggests the existence of a
positive correlation between occupational pension variables and the individual e¤ects,
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that generates a positive and substantial bias in the returns to occupational pensions
estimated by OLS. This important e¤ect of individual unobservable characteristics in
the estimation of the returns to occupational pensions is consistent with an endogenous
sorting of workers into occupational pensions schemes, as implied by the theoretical
framework proposed by Ippolito (1997).
Finally, columns four of Table 7 reports the IVop results. The u-shape of the esti-
mated returns over tenure is preserved, but the estimated coe¢ cients, not only decrease
further in magnitude for all tenure levels but they are also no longer statistically signif-
icant from zero at the beginning of the worker career. Thus, also job specic unobserv-
able characteristics positively correlated with occupational pension variables appear to
be important in shaping the returns to occupational pensions. Indeed, our ndings
are consistent with least squares estimation results having a positive bias due to both
individual and job match heterogeneity. The inuence of these unobservable factors
completely explains the important wage premia for low levels of tenure estimated using
least squares. Thus, our results support not only the argument that more able (produc-
tive) workers are more likely to join an occupational pension scheme (Ippolito, 1997)
but also the one arguing that workers with better job matches (and thus higher wages)
are more likely to have occupational pensions (Gustman and Steninmeier, 1993).
6 Conclusion
We assess the impact of occupational pensions on wages and on the tenure-wage prole
of UK workers, accounting for endogeneity issues in the selection mechanism of workers
16
into occupational pension schemes. Our empirical strategy allows to test alternative
theoretical mechanisms proposed in the literature to explain the usual nding of wage
premia accruing to occupational pension workers. The results show that the estimated
pension wage premium is large and signicant using least squares in a cross section
of workers. When we use panel data and instrumental variable estimators to control
for endogeneity issues, the magnitude of the premium decreases sharply, and it looses
statistical signicance. Furthermore, allowing the returns to occupational pensions to
depend on tenure enables us to compare tenure wage proles between participants and
non participants to occupational pensions schemes and to appreciate the variation of
the wage premium over their career. In particular, we nd that the wage premium is
high and signicant early in the career when the nancial quit disincentives implicit in
occupational pension plans of the DB type are less binding. Consistently with Akerlof
and Katz (1989) model predictions, wage premia evaporate as tenure grows and pension
incentives become important. The wage premium at all di¤erent stages of a workers
career appear to be completely explained by individual and job match specic hetero-
geneity. Thus, our ndings are consistent both with the theoretical literature predicting
that occupational pensions and wage proles are used in combination to retain better
workers (Ippolitos sorting hypothesis) and with the one arguing that that workers
with better job matches (and thus higher wages) are more likely to have occupational
pensions (Gustman and Steninmeiers e¢ ciency wage hypothesis).
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Notes
1See Andrietti (2003).
2Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993).
3The vesting period is the minimum period that a worker has to stay in the plan in order
to be entitled to her pension rights.
4Like a lower discount rate.
5Akerlof and Katz (1989).
6See Montgomery, Shaw and Benedict (1992) among others.
7Government Actuarys Department (1995, 2001, 2003).
8The BHPS data can be obtained from the ESRC Data Archive. We acknowledge the
original data creators and depositors. They bear no responsibility for the analyses and inter-
pretations presented here.
9Estimating model (1) without occupational pensions variables separately for workers join-
ing and not joining occupational pensions schemes we nd that the e¤ects of the explanatory
variables on wages in not dissimilar between the two groups. That is why we adopt this
dummy variables set up.
10See Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), Finnie (1993), among others.
11For example, it is reasonable to think that workers in better job matches end up joining
a pension scheme because they have a higher expectancy to maintain their employment re-
lationship. If better matches are also associated with higher wages least squares estimators
of the returns to occupational pensions are expected to be upward biased, due to unobserved
job match heterogeneity. Also, unobserved individual heterogeneity may bias the results up-
ward. Firms probably o¤er occupation pensions to attract and retain more productive (able)
workers. As a result, more productive (able) workers will more probably end up joining a
pension scheme. If better workers also receive higher wages, then unobserved individual het-
erogeneity will induce an additional upward bias in the least squares estimates of the returns
to occupational pensions.
12In particular, they may overestimate the returns to occupational pensions in presence of
positive correlation between the decision to participate on a pension scheme and unobservable
factors a¤ecting positively wages that are not caused by the participation to an occupational
pension scheme.
13This method consists on instrumenting the tenure variables with their deviations from
job-match means, instruments that result, by construction, orthogonal to the error terms in
model (1) : In the same fashion experience variables are instrumented with their deviations
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from individual means, that are, by construction, orthogonal to the individual xed e¤ects.
Investigating a possible further source of bias in the returns to tenure and experience stemming
from a correlation between the experience instruments and the job match component is beyond
the purpose of this paper. (see Dustmann and Pereira, 2003, for a recent discussion on these
issues, and an application in the UK context).
14Standard errors are in parenthesis. Coe¢ cients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks
are signicant at 10 (5) [1] percent level.
15Time, industry, occupation, employer size, marital status and regional dummies included
and not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Coe¢ cients marked with one (two)
[three] asterisks are signicant at 10 (5) [1] percent level.
16The inclusion of OP, that may control for assortative matching, does not alter qualitatively
any set of estimation results.
17Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests comparing OLS and WG (columns three and four, Table 6)
and WG and IVop (columns four and ve, Table 6 ) for the occupational pension participation
coe¢ cient, rejects the hypothesis of their equality in all cases. Note that, according to model
specication (1), we interpret as job match specic e¤ects any unobservable factor di¤erent
from unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity.
18The estimated returns to k years of tenure are:
@wijt
@OPijt
= b6 + b7  Tijt + b8  T 2ijt;
where Tijt = k = f1; 5; 10; 15; 20; 25; 30; 35g :
Standard errors (in parentheses) are the square roots of
var(b6) + T 2ijt  var(b7) + var(b8)  T 4ijt
+2cov(b6; b7)  Tijt + 2cov(b6; b8)  T 2ijt
+2cov(b7; b8)  T 3ijt
Coe¢ cients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks are signicant at 10 (5) [1] percent
level.
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Appendix 1: Description of main variables
wage: real gross hourly wage. Nominal hourly wage is obtained dividing the current
gross monthly pay by 4.33 (weekly wage) and then by weekly hours. Weekly hours are
the sum of the number of hours normally worked per week and the number of paid
overtime hours in normal week. The nominal hourly wage is then deated with the
Retail Price Index.
op (Occupational Pension O¤ered): dummy variable equal to one if the worker is
eligible to join an employers pension scheme.
opj (Occupational Pension O¤ered-Joined): dummy variable equal to one if the
worker actually joins an available pension scheme.
tenure: number of years spent working with the current employer. In the BHPS,
individuals are asked to give the starting date of the job spell, and not the spell with
employer. In order to identify the starting date with the present employer, we go back
as many spells as there are job changes with the same employer. This involves using
retrospective information (job history record, lifetime employer history record, lifetime
employment status history record).
experience: number of years since the individual left full time education.
personal pension: dummy variable equal to one if the individual has a personal
pension.
union coverage: dummy variable equal to one if the individual is covered by a union.
union membership: dummy variable equal to one if the individual actually belongs
to a union.
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job training: dummy variable equal to one if the individual receives job related
training.
temporary job: dummy variable equal to one if the individual has a temporary job.
married: dummy variable equal to one if the individual is married.
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Private Sector Scheme Active Members by Plan Type
Occupationale Pensions: 1991 1995 2000
DB Plans 81.5 80 80.7
DC Plans 18.5 20 19.3
Source: Government Actuarys Department (1995, 2001, 2003)
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Table 2: Occupational Pension Schemes Coverage and Participation
O¤ered OP 75.6
O¤ered OP - joined 60.8
O¤ered OP - not joined - PP 7.3
O¤ered OP - not joined - SERPS 7.5
Not O¤ered OP 24.4
Not O¤ered OP - PP 13
Not O¤ered OP - SERPS 11.4
Source: Our elaboration on BHPS data.
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Table 3: Average Pension Status Transitions over Years-Percentages
Pension Status: year t+ 1
Pension Status :
year t
OP j OP no j, PP OP no j, SERPS No OP, PP No OP, SERPS
OP j 71.4 9.2 9.3 1.2 8.9
OP no j, PP 7.5 78.8 1.3 6.6 5.8
OP no j, SERPS 13.7 1 58.3 7.8 19.2
No OP, PP 1.3 11 8.7 66 13
No OP, SERPS 3.2 1.6 1.3 0.5 93.5
Source: Our elaboration on BHPS data.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics by Pension Status (Means)
Variable OP j OP no j, PP OP no j, SERPS No OP, PP No OP, SERPS
Log Hourly Wage 2.21 1.894 1.83 1.926 1.76
Tenure 10 6.11 4.06 6.5 4
Experience 23.8 19.6 18.92 21.9 19.35
Union Coverage (%) 54.6 35 43.63 16.55 18.36
Union Membership (%) 41.6 24.8 22.84 12.25 9.7
Job Training (%) 40.7 32.6 29.87 24.3 22
Temporary Job (%) 0.6 1.4 4.4 3.1 9.3
Married (%) 82.91 73.56 69.4 77.36 66.15
Sample Size 5.534 662 683 1.184 1.040
Source: Our elaboration on BHPS data.
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Table 5: Pension O¤er Rate by Firm Size, Industry and Union Coverage
Manufacturing Distribution Services
Union No Union Union No Union Union No Union
Small Firm 51.2 80 49.1 81.8 49.1 84.7
Medium Firm 80.4 93 77.8 100 73.5 92.1
Large Firm 81.8 98.1 100 100 80 96.4
Source: Our elaboration on BHPS data.
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Table 6: Estimation Results - Main Variables
OLS OLS2 WG IVop
OP 0.0107
(0.0128)
OPJ 0.2309*** 0.2361*** 0.0603*** 0.0071
(0.0174) (0.0163) (0.0125) (0.2058)
OPJ*Tenure -0.0062* -0.0060* -0.0073*** -0.0226**
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0108)
OPJ*Tenure Squared 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0007*
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.0001) (0.0004)
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Table 7: Cumulative Returns to Occupational Pensions
OLS2 WG IVop
1 year tenure 0.2303*** 0.0588** -0.0147
(0.0543) (0.0229) (0.2080)
5 years tenure 0.2106 0.0320 -0.0874
(0.2692) (0.4109) (0.2559)
10 years tenure 0.1947 0.0207 -0.1452
(0.6372) (0.6859) (1.0725)
15 years tenure 0.1884 0.0263 -0.1664
(1.1930) (0.8827) (2.6518)
20 years tenure 0.1916 0.0485 -0.1509
(1.9693) (1.1003) (4.9362)
25 years tenure 0.2044 0.0876 -0.0987
(2.9757) (1.4569) (7.9199)
30 years tenure 0.2267 0.1436 -0.0098
(4.2153) (2.0282) (11.6018)
35 years tenure 0.2587 0.2165 0.1158
(5.6892) (2.8327) (15.9814)
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Table 8: Estimation Results - Complete List of Variables
OLS OLS2 WG IVop
OP 0.0107
(0.0128)
OPJ 0.2310 *** 0.2361*** 0.0603*** 0.0071
(0.0174) (0.0163) (0.0125) (0.2058)
OPJ*Tenure -0.0062 * -0.0060* -0.0073*** -0.0226**
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0108)
OPJ*Tenure Squared 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0007*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Tenure 0.0043 0.0043 0.0136 *** 0.0215*
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0117)
Tenure Squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0007*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Experience 0.0375*** 0.0375*** 0.0288*** 0.0330***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0045) (0.0040)
Experience Squared -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0008 *** -0.0008***
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00009)
Personal Pension 0.0729*** 0.0728*** 0.0225*** 0.0053
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0074) (0.0275)
Union Coverage -0.0158 -0.0146 0.0321*** 0.0377***
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0102) (0.0136)
Union Membership 0.0252 * 0.0248* 0.0507*** 0.0673***
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0119) (0.0240)
Job Training 0.0637*** 0.0639*** -0.0012 0.0013
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0056) (0.0060)
Temporary Job -0.0218 -0.0245 -0.0707*** -0.0940*
(0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0179) (0.0483)
Constant 2.0002*** 2.0052*** 2.1388*** 2.0291***
(0.0323) (0.0317) (0.1250) (0.1533)
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